Association-Japan will probably cause irritation -and it is meant to cause such irritation. lt is the pointed version of my answer to the invitation to address the meeting with a special emphasis on European foreign policy and constructivist theories. The title plays with three (more or less well established) concepts-"normative power", "European foreign policy" and "multilateralism". lt does so in order to identify what I consider to be a central problematique of contemporary European politics.
As the following discussion will show I will use these concepts in a particular fashion -esp. by expanding their uses compared to how these concepts have come to be understood in the context of International Relations discourse in general and the study of European Union politics in particular. The purpose of this move is to arrive at what I would hope is a cogent description of the "state of the European Union" in a world which is -as German foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier often puts it these days -"out of joinf ' (Steinmeier 2015) . Another way of putting this in more academic terms is to suggest that I will choose a strategy of conscious defamiliarization of established disciplinary language games in order to offer a different way of theorizing EUropean foreign policy.
The background or setting for such a strategy of defamiliarization rs * Eu "f:~iföft<J m36-' i5-. Ifl' .Jilt2s:1F 4 JJ can be summarized by reference to two stark and contradictory descriptions of Europe's situation which lie apart by only two years. one by the most infiuential IR theorist, one by a young conservative writer.
In what was probably his last interview Kenneth W altz in March 2013 (Waltz and Simon 2013) was asked to analyze the contemporary global political order. The interview ended with a discussion of "the issue of rising powers" in the context of Europe. Waltz summarized his main thesis right at the start: "When major powers decline they become uninteresting. Just like Athens and Sparta after the rise of Rome, Germany and France are uninteresting now." He then poked fun at "people ( · · ·) arguing how wonderful it is that Europe has become pacific. but do these people know any history ? An inevitable consequence of once (sie !) great powers heading towards decline is that they become more peaceful. We should expect nothing less of them." The interview then closed with the question whether the European Union would "represent the end or mitigation of anarchy in Europe" or whether we should "expect the return of power competition in Europe". lt is worth quoting W altz's answer in full: Anarchy is the basic cause and condition of international politics and so it is present in Europe. 2015 James Poulos (2015) had this to say about France being "at war with Germany":
The sheer outrage of the attacks has reminded even Hollande of how unnatural and belittling German control over French budgeting has come to feel. "The security pact takes precedence over the stability pact," as he announced at a joint session of parliament. ("· )
France's nationalistic insurgency is just the beginning. (-") Merkers approach to keeping the eurozone intact was viewed by many Europeans as everything from bunk economics to moral bankruptcy. and its dead yet grasping hand was invasive enough to stir up memories of the deceptively distant Nazi occupation. (--·) A turn in France toward popular force. and against bankers' restraint (" ·) would be a decisive blow to Merkers reign in Europe. No other nation in Europe is consequential enough to have anchored the EU as an equal partner with Germany, and no other can hold its lesser members together with an alternate worldview as firmly established as Germany's own. ( " ·) If history was made that bloody night in Paris, it could weil be France's return to dominance. This is the setting-and the contrast could not be starker. Here the grand old realist of IR theory declaring "boring" European peace. there the young polemical conservative seeing France and Germany approaching war. These assessments lie just two and a half years apart-but for Europe they look like an era.
In the following I will develop my alternative description of the state of Europe step by step by exploring the concepts "normative powers", "European foreign policy" and "minilateralism" and how they hang together in circumscribing one of the central problematiques of contemporary European politics. Scholars in the field of European studies are weil familiar with the debate about "'Normative Power Europe"' which is associated most closely with an article by Ian Manners (Manners 2002) . However, practitioners and non-academics may not as easily understand what the concept means because ordinary Janguage uses of the three words "normative" ··power" and "Europe" would render their combination in a single concept to be, at a minimum. in need of explanation. "Europe" is the easiest part-despite the fact that the geographical and the political signifiers are no longer in sync. A quick look at the map and the borders of the EU on the hand and the geographical boundaries of the European continent on the other shows this. lt is remarkable indeed that the widespread identification of the word "Europe" with the region encompassing only the EU has largely superseded the historical and geographical reference to Europe as a region which naturally encompasses Russia --or at least parts of it. However, even if we take the delimitation of "Europe"' to the political entity of the EU for granted the reference to a union of nation states in combination with "power" would still mark an unusual collocation because the ordinary language games of great power politics normally reserves this particular use of the power signifier for "coherent" political units such as nation states. In other words, the very fact that · "EUrope" is by now widely assimilated to other political entities in "power"' terms refl.ects on the institutional mat-.
2 ) uration which the EU has gone through.
From an ordinary language point of view the most irritating aspect of the neologism "Normative Power Europe" is the combination of "normative"' and "power" because the normativity implicitly insinuated is one which associates "power" with some general good -or. was weil aware of the counterintuitive combination of the adjective "normative" and the concept of "power" because the second part of the title of his initial article already posed the question whether "normative power Europe" is a "contradiction in terms" (Manners 2002 ).
As it turns out, the purely rhetorical quality of the question was quickly revealed when Manners explained his understanding of "normative". among others, with a reference to "the ability to define what passes for 'normal' in world politics" (Manners 2002: 236, 240) . Tellingly, this ··ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations" (Manners 2002: 239) was not even mentioned among the different mcanings of normative power ten years later when Manners revisited Lhe "Normative Power Europe" debate he had started. "Three particular meanings" of normative power "in EU studies" were now listed instead:
( 1) uses in "normative theory. that is how we judge and justify truth claims in social science": (2)normative power "as a form of power (pouvoir) that is ideational rather than material or physical": and (3)normative power "as a characterization of an ideal type of global actor (puissance) " (Manners 2013: 308-309) . Among these meanings the initial cl efinition -"the ability to define what passes for 'normal' in world poli-3 J Lies" had completely disappeared.
One of the lessons to be learned from this naming exercise is that "normative power" is what in semiotics is called an ··empty signifier" -ie. "a signifier with a vague. highly variable, unspecifiable or non-existent signified" which "means different things to different people: they may stand for many or even any signifieds" (see Chandler 2015) . In hindsight Manners' neologizing effort has turned out to be a smart move nevertheless in at least three respects. The usual citation indices show that it helped Manners' academic career (see Google Scholar) . in the moral purposes of the universe" (Morgenthau 1985 [19481 13 ) .
Finally the concept helped to push-start a whole new "Normative Powers" (NP) industry or "Normative Powers research complex". In part this included the proliferation or recovery of concepts with a certain family resemblance -such as the older "civilian power Europe" (Bull 1982 ), "ethical power Europe" (Hyde-Price 2008) or "liberal power Europe" (Wagner 2015) . But it also included other neologisms which were supposed to mark counterpoints-such as "Idiot Power" (Carta 2014 One of the reasons why this research program looked attractive to start a new "debate" among EU scholars. especially in EUrope itself, was that it was placed at the center of liberal/constructivist theorizing -in other words. it was not framed in the stereotypical "realist'' language (which is largely marginalized in EUropean IR anyhow). Moreover, the attractiveness of combining "normative" with "power" was quickly emulated with regard to other "powers'" such as China (Callahan & Barabantseva 2011; Kavalski 2013) , India (Hall 2015) or Japan up prominently in some recent publications reemphasizes the "empty signifier" function of "normative power". Kavalski, for instance, introduced still another criterion for "normative power" -besides the ability
to "shape what can be 'normal' in international life". In his view normative powers also had to express "a desire to be recognized" by others (Kavalski 2013: 258) .
For my own purposes this is a helpful expansion of "normative power" usage since it redirects our attention to the fundamentally social or Jrns to offer some of these additional meanings when he speaks of "the normative force of the factual". This idea of "the factual" carrying "normative force" is based on the view that the "factual" is almost instinct ively taken to be the "normal" and that both are deeply intertwined at the same time with the "normative" because fundamental socialization processes render us (as "social agents" and due to our cognitive capacitie::;) to take the "factual", "normal" and "normative" as being separable --4 ) at best for "analytical" purposes.
This idea of an innate "tendency of elevating the factual to the normal" while conceiving it at the same time as being inherently "normative" seems to be useful for analyzing contemporary EUropean foreign policy in the context of a broader "Normative Powers"-debate for two reasons. First, it links an expanded understanding of "normative power (s)"
to previous usages of the concept in such a way that the lopsidedly positive semantic load is replaced with an understanding of "normativity" which allows for "good" as well as "evil" forces. In concrete terms: The EUropean Union, then. is as much a "normative power" as is Russia because both have issued powerful claims "to define what passes for 'normal' in world politics" in the recent crisis over the annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine. More provocatively still: Both the EU and the "Islamic State" exercise "normative power" in the sense that the "form of power (pouvoir)" they use is, at a minimum, as much "ideational" as it is "material or physical" (see Manners 2013: 308-309) . The definitional criterion of power which Max Weber emphasized-ie. that the "chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action" is realized "even against the rcsistance of others who are participating in the same action" (Weber et. al. 1946: 180 ) -this definitional criterion of power is much less helpful in analyzing these and other important conflicts in contemporary international politics because the number of cases of "great power" conflicts with clear-cut powerful winners are hard to identify even with regard to the most powerful players. Just on the sideline: this is one of the reasons why a book like the one which Moises Naim published (Naim 2013) has become a bestseller: the idea that "power" itself has "become perishable, transient, evanescent" resonates.
In sum: Rather than focusing on what is presumably the "correct"
understanding of "normative'' and/ or "power" I am suggesting an approach which takes the uses of these concepts seriously while at the same time broadening the reach of conceptual investigations in order to recover buried meanings which can be useful analytically. This is an approach to concept formation (and therefore: "theorizing") which marries when put in our own alternative idiom" (Rorty 1979 : 365) .
In such an understanding the particular attractiveness of the concept 36 Normative Powers and European Foreign Policy in a Minilateralist World (HELLMANN) of "normative powers" lies in the political struggles to which they point.
The EUropean Union as a "normative power" is stuck in political struggles with "normative power Russia" and "normative power Islamic State" over what should (or: what must not) "pass for "normal'". And it isin bot11 regards -as much an "ideationar struggle as it has "material or physicar dimensions.
Europ ean Foreign Policy as Boundary Drawing
This brings us to the second key concept in my title, ''European for-'ign policy", and how this concept hangs together with "normative power (s) ". As in the case of "Normative Power Emope" 1 will try to show how a conceptual recontextualization of "European foreign policy" tnight also help to better understand EUrope's current predicament.
This recontextualization will focus on the fact that the concept of "Europcan foreign policy" points to both. the EUs expanding efforts to act m; a single foreign policy actor and the renaissance of "foreign policy" (within ) the European Union. ie. among its member states. In some cases-but these are the less important ones-this is the oldfashioned unilateralism of individual members states acting in "the national interest" which undermines a common EU stance. The more critical cases are those where EU member states have, in recent years.
ever more often yielded to other "factual" normative powers. As illustrations one could point to forces such as international financial markets (as in the so-called "Euro crisis" with Greece at its center) , the "domestic"
demands of "indigenous" electorates which call for a tightening of borders (as in the current refugee crisis) or the determined push of political classes in some of the more powerful member countries to obligate other EU members to show "solidarity" (as in Germany's push for a redistribution of refugees among EU members (Traynor & Kingsley 2015) dent actor' enables the inclusion of phenomena such as the European Union; external relations are 'official' to allow the inclusion of outputs from all parts of the governing mechanisms of the state or enterprise while also maintaining parsimony with respect to the vast number of international transactions now being conducted; policy is the 'sum' of these official relations because otherwise every particular action could be seen as a separate foreign policy-whereas actors usually seek some degree of coherence towards the outside world. Lastly, the policy is 'foreign' because the world is still more separated into distinctive communities than it is as single, homogenizing entity. These communities therefore need strategies for coping with foreigners (or strangers) in their various aspects (it should be noted that the word 'foreign' derives from the latin 'foris' meaning 'outside') . (Hill 2003: 3) 1 f. in contrast, one conceives of "foreign policy" not in terms of a s1atic property of "states" in a so-called "Westphalian system" but, inslcad. in terms of an historically contingent political practice which creftlas aml constantly reproduces "foreign" (and, for that matter, also "don1cstic") subjects in the first place, "European foreign policy" becomes a bundle of fascinating "boundary drawing performances" in Richard Ashky's sense:
Why not put aside our readiness to conceive foreign policy as ac-1 ion on the part of pre-given actors who have well-defined compet encies and who respect pre-given boundaries of social and political action ? ( " · ) Why not understand foreign policy as a specific sort o( interpretive performance whose overlapping effects include (a) the CMstitution and empowering of states and other subjects. (b) the defining of their socially recognized competencies. and (c) the securing of the boundaries that differentiate domestic and international, economic and social spheres of practice and, with them, the proper domains in which specific subjects may secure recognition and compe-fEpj;: EU ~4'<1f.$!ll ~36-l'}. Sf<Jili:281f 4 J'l tently act? In short, why not regard foreign policy as a specific kind of boundary producing political performance ? (Ashley 1987: 53) In Ashley's understanding foreign policy is "boundary drawing" both with regard to how the EU acts collectively vis-ä-vis its ··outside" and how its constituent parts (ie. member states) draw and redraw boundaries among themselves-ie. how they constitute one another as states.
how they delimit their competencies. and how they define how the boundaries that differentiate domestic and international, economic and social spheres of practice are to be drawn (for a more detailed discussion see Heilmann 2016b).
Let me illustrate this perspective first with a brief look at the institutional structure of European foreign policy, and. secondly, with regard to three of the recent crises of foreign policy in the European Union.
As far as the institutional structure of the EU is concerned there is no need in this audience to go into much detail. Suffice it to say that over the past few decades the EU has built an impressive bureaucratic apparatus which resembles in many ways what we know from the clas- The second European foreign policy cns1s of recent years, the Greek dobls/ Euro-crisis is normally not dealt with in terms of "foreign policy" lwcause in the normal language of European politics this was, so to say, n "domestic" EUropean issue in the sense that it involved ministerial b11n:aucracies other than foreign ministries. Yet in the understanding of foreign policy I have suggested above with reference to Richard Ashley this crisis has been one of the most critical "foreign policy" crises in 1 hc EU's history because it mobilized internal boundary drawing practirus among member states. esp. Greece and Germany which have not nnly undermined the cohesion of the Union by resurrecting nationalistic 1: 1w1Lirncnts but which have also driven home the point that the normal ivc; power of the "solidarity"-clause in the Treaty of the European llnicm often reaches its Jimits at the border of the nation state (for a diswssion of the legal force of the solidarity clause see Kadelbach 'f'his applies equally to my third example, the recent refugee crisiswith the only difference that it is now Germany which is calling for tlu: "solidarity" of EU partners to share the burden. The fact that Ger-fB :;f<: EU ~i'<1f.:ffU ~36%. :if!!ilt28'<!0 4 FJ also underlines the Jellinekian "normative force of the factual" in the sense that the very fact of masses of refugees fl.ooding into the EU has been widely perceived in European public opinion as a fundamental threat to established ways of life in addition to rapidly undermining both a key achievement of European integration. ie. the Sehengen Agreement and cherished "liberal" asylum laws (for a more detailed discussion see Heilmann 2016c).
In sum: The analysis of European foreign policy at the institutional level of the Union as a whole and with regard to the day-to-day practice of foreign policy as a boundary producing political performance of constituting "insiders" and "outsiders" has highlighted both the ambivalence of and the clashes between different normative powers. lt has not only accentuated the boundary between EUropeans and non-EUropeans but also reintroduced EUropeans to one another as "foreigners".
The European Union in a Minilateralist World
My third key term, minilateralism. is best introduced via its much better known opposite, multilateralism. Given the penchant for definitional (rather than Wittgensteinian) approaches to concept formation in Po- goods (eg. peace) (2)non-discrimination (as in trade agreements) or (:1)diffuse reciprocity, ie. arrangements in which participants focus less ou immediate and direct benefits in the form of specific quids-pro-quos 1 han on roughly equivalent benefits in the aggregate and over time (Ruggie 1992: 571-572) .
rr you are Willing to work with Ruggie's understanding you will probobly immediately accept that the European integration project is the 111ost successful experiment in the history of the "Westphalian state sys-1(lJ1)" which has institutionalized multilateralism. To be sure: multilateralil:!Jll has been a celebrated feature of the so-called "liberal world order"
Hlld t·hcrefore figured prominently also in other international institutional sd 1 ing::; after 1945 (see Heilmann 2013: 103-110 ). Yet nowhere was an iJ1logration project based as much on the foundational social practice of diff11s<: reciprocity -which we normally observe only in tighter social unn1Ps --as in the European Union.
:r l· is against this background that the spread of "minilateralism" is p:irticularly worrisome. The neologism "minilateralism" is a creation of Moi::;cs Naim (2009) which is obviously meant to set a counterpoint to "!1i1Jltilateralism". In Naim's positive connotation "minilateralism" describes f1 fr11mework of cooperation which gets together the "smallest possible lll!Oib<tr of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solvinH a f)articular problem. Think of this as minilateralism's magic numlwr."
Thon: is nothing wrong per se with minilateral cooperation. Who w1ild be against "cooperation" ! The problem is that the smallest possible _ 1111111 bcr for effective problem-solving q uickly grows very large -and in-C: r'1)06i ngly so if one looks around at the current menu of crises. Considtll', Jor instance, the number and political weight of countries needed to crf1,c tlvely address the problems associated with the civil war in Syria. 
Conclusions
EUrope and its key member states may weil face "decline" (as Kenneth W altz pointed out three years ago). Yet. compared lo W altz's analysis in 2013 Europe's "peace" looks much more precarious t(>day ;;incl the overall "state of the Union" much less "boring'' and "lu1ppy''. The EU does not face just one more of those crises which ·it has . sL1 ccos~fLtl·
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Normative Powers and European Foreign Policy in a Minilateralist World (HELLMANN) ly mastered in the past decades -and as a result of which it has moved "forward" in either expanding its reach (by drawing in new members or associates) or deepening integrative structures (via a "common foreign and security policy", the creation of the European External Action Service, or the banking union). The core predicament of the European Union today is that the proliferation of external and internal crises within the EU and in EUrope's "neighborhood" have undermined fundamental institutional routines and established practices. What is more: it has for the first time shattered the belief that the project of European integration is irreversible.
Other powers Cie. collective actors such as "great powers" or "factual powers" such as refugees or populist electorates) encroach ever more successfully in defining what is "normal" in issue areas and/ or regional contexts where the European Union and its member states were able to shape things much more to their liking in the past. Whereas "Normative Power Europe" succeeded remarkably as a collective actor in defining what passes for "normal" during the first decade after the end of the Cold War ("Eastern Enlargement". "European Neighborhood Policy" (ENP) etc.) the past few years have seen a much more defensive EU which increasingly had to adjust (at least gradually) to the normative "normality" standards either set by outsiders (eg. Russia. Turkey, Syria/ ISIS terrorists) or by internal forces seeking to undermine or reverse what had been achieved in past rounds of deepening integration (eg. Germany's push for strengthening intergovernmental mechanisms in financial matters or the British push towards re-nationalizing EU competencies).
In other words: "European foreign policy" as boundary producing political performance by ever more "foreign policy" actors at different societal levels faces a multitude of normative or factual powers for which it is not (yet) weil prepared. The predicament looks stark because some of the more clearly "external" and collective challenges of "Euro- 3 ) The only reference to "normality" in his 2013 article was in the context of a reference to the work of Roland Bleiker and "narrative norms" in so-called "postmodern science" which were said to "legitimate certain narratives and recognize that 'the ability to define normality interferes with virtually all aspects of the international'" (Man- 
